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NOTES AND COMMENTS
WAS THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY TRASHED IN
CALIFORNIA v. GREENWOOD?
I. INTRODUCTION
Every day our private notes and letters, bank and income state-
ments, bills, medical records, and many other sensitive secrets end up in
our garbage. Some may argue that a privacy interest in garbage is unnec-
essary to clean-living, honest citizens. This attitude, however, ignores
the need of the individual for privacy and individuality.' Some may ar-
gue that if people want to maintain privacy in their garbage, they should
dispose of it on their own. This analysis makes an individual's right to
privacy dependent on the affordability of an incinerator or paper shred-
der,2 and ignores the fact that most cities and states have laws which
mandate the manner in which trash must be disposed.' We would be
incensed to find that a meddler-a neighbor, reporter, or detective-had
scrutinized our trash to discover details of our personal lives.4
1. See A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 48 (1971). "An individual's desire to control
the information that comprises his life history is a natural part of the quest for personal autonomy
... " Id.
2. In Tulsa, Oklahoma, Randy Gwartney has a lucrative business he calls Shredders by
George. He shreds private papers for businesses and private individuals and then issues a "certificate
of destruction." Few people may be able to afford such a service and a new shredder costs from $850
to $15,000. Blum, Private Papers, Sensitive Secrets Make For Stacks of Stuffing, Tulsa World, Sept.
18, 1988, at Fl, col. 1. Almost all large cities have services of this kind. Telephone interview with
Randy Gwartney (Jan. 16, 1989).
3. "[1'he State should [not] be permitted to on the one hand demand citizens give their gar-
bage to the State, primarily in the form of local ordinances restricting the transportation, possession,
and storage of trash and at the same time declare open season on surveillance of its contents for
public examination and criminal prosecution." Brief for Respondent at 7 n.2, California v. Green-
wood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (No. 86-684). "It would be a perversion" to interpret fourth amend-
ment protection as extending "only to those who resort to extraordinary means to keep information
regarding their personal lives out of the hands of the police." 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 2.6(c), 478-79 (2d ed. 1987).
4. See State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Anstead, J., dissent-
ing). See also United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
479 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 239 (1974), where the court stated:
[t]he concept of privacy is paramount in deciding a claimant's standing to invoke the pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment. Courts should be hesitant to narrow that concept be-
cause, in this society, the sphere of personal privacy has become more and more confined.
In a real sense, if courts begrudge the scope of the privacy expectations of the populace, not
1
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that it is unreasonable for
society to expect that its garbage is private. In California v. Greenwood'
the United States Supreme Court allowed the fruits of warrantless
searches of trash to be used as evidence against a criminal defendant,
thus holding that privacy rights of Americans do not extend to their
trash. The broad holding in Greenwood makes society's right to privacy
in garbage contingent upon the uncontrolled will of a police officer and
does not take into account society's need for privacy in garbage.'
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
The Laguna Beach Police Department suspected that Billy Green-
wood was a drug dealer. In February of 1984, a federal narcotics agent
informed Investigator Stracner of the department that a truck full of ille-
gal narcotics was en route to Greenwood's residence.' Later, neighbors
told Stracner that automobiles made frequent, short stops at Green-
wood's home in the late evening and early morning hours." In addition,
neighbors said that a U-Haul truck had been parked in front of the house
for four days.'
Acting on this information Stracner began to make late-night obser-
vations of Greenwood's residence.' 0 She observed the cars come and go
as the neighbors had described. 1 On one occasion she followed a truck
only will there be less and less freedom of the person, but his or her expectations of free-
dom will wither and with them the values of individuality and privacy from increasingly
intrusive government control.
Id. at 793-94, quoted in Respondent's Brief at 8, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988)
(No. 86-684).
5. 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
6. "The ultimate question" put forth in fourth amendment cases is "whether, if the particular
form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional re-
straints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass
inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society." W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 2.6(c), at 478
(quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 348, 403 (1974)),
Garbage surveillance by police should not go "unregulated, for a society in which all 'our citizens'
trash cans could be made the subject of police inspection' for evidence of the more intimate aspects
of their personal life upon nothing more than a whim is not 'free and open.'" Id. (quoting People v.
Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 367, 486 P.2d 1262, 1269, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 69 (1971), vacated on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 33 (1972)).
7. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
[Vol. 24:401
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from the house to another residence thought to be a location for narcot-
ics trafficking.12
Stracner began to search trash that Greenwood set on the curb of
his home for collection. 3 The trash was tied in opaque plastic bags. 4 In
April of 1984, Stracner told the trash collector to keep Greenwood's
trash separate from other trash in the truck and turn it over to her. 15
The trash collector obliged, Stracner searched through the trash, and
"found items indicative of narcotics use." 6 She used the information
acquired from the trash search to obtain a warrant to search Green-
wood's home. 7 When police, executing the warrant, found hashish and
cocaine,18 they arrested Greenwood on felony narcotics charges. Green-
wood later posted bail.19
Officer Rahaeuser, another police investigator, subsequently re-
ceived reports of further late-night activities at Greenwood's home. 0 He
obtained Greenwood's garbage just as Stracner had done and again
found evidence of narcotics use. 1 Using information from this second
trash search, Rahaeuser secured another search warrant for Green-
wood's home. 2 The police found more drugs and evidence of trafficking
when they executed the warrant. Again, Greenwood was arrested.2"
The California Superior Court dismissed the charges against Green-
wood, a relying on People v. Krivda,5 which held that warrantless trash
searches violate the fourth amendment and the California Constitution.26
The court found that the warrants for the search of Greenwood's home
would not have been issued, due to a lack of probable cause, without
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Brief for Opposition at 1, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (No. 86-684).
"There was no evidence any contraband could be seen without opening the bag." Id.
15. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1627-28.
24. Id. at 1628.
25. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 33
(1972).
26. Id. at 367, 486 P.2d at 1269, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 69. In Krivda, on facts very similar to those in
Greenwood, the California Supreme Court found that an individual who places contraband in trash
barrels and subsequently places the barrels adjacent to the street for pickup by a garbage collector,
may not be deemed to have foresaken any reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the
contents of the barrels.
1989]
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information gleaned from the trash searches which was subsequently
used in affadavits to obtain the warrants.27
The court of appeals affirmed,28 the California Supreme Court re-
fused to review the court of appeals' decision,29 and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.3"
B. Issue
The United States Supreme Court found that the warrantless search
and seizure of garbage bags left at the curb outside a home violates the
fourth amendment only if individuals manifest "a subjective expectation
of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reason-
able."31 The question before the Court was whether society is prepared
to accept as objectively reasonable an expectation of privacy in trash de-
posited at the curb for collection.32
III. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
The fourth amendment 33 does not give the government an uncon-
trolled and free rein to monitor the attitudes, lifestyles, and activities of
citizens. 34 The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment pro-
hibits the government from monitoring citizens without the intervention
of a neutral and detached magistrate who will issue a search warrant if
27. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988). There was no information absent
the evidence found in the trash that would support a reasonable conclusion that narcotics would be
found in Greenwood's home. Id.
28. People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 227 Cal Rptr. 539 (1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct,
1625 (1988).
29. The California Supreme Court was bound to follow the Krivda precedent unless or until the
United States Supreme Court decided the fourth amendment question differently. See, e.g., Califor-
nia v. Rooney, 107 S. Ct. 2852, 2855 (1987) (per curiam).
30. California v. Greenwood, 107 S. Ct. 3260 (1987). Although the Krivda decision was bind-
ing on the court of appeals, Krivda "also held that the fruits of warrantless trash searches were to be
excluded under federal law." Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
31. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988). The Court used a two-part test
developed in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See infra notes 82-
101 and accompanying text for a discussion of Katz.
32. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
33. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution states: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), where the Court stated that the fourth
amendment applies
to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes [sic] of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummag-
ing of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his
4
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the government can show probable cause." The Court has explained
that an officer attempting to fight crime "may lack sufficient objectivity
to weigh correctly the strength of the evidence supporting the contem-
plated action against the individual's interest in protecting his own lib-
erty and the privacy of his home."36 In 1914, the Court reached the
logical conclusion that if government officials should violate the fourth
amendment by conducting a warrantless search and seizure on a criminal
suspect they should not be able to use the fruits of the search as evidence
against the accused at trial.37 This policy is known as the "exclusionary
rule."3 Once the rule was established, the problem for the courts be-
came that of establishing a standard for deciding whether there had in
fact been a violation of the fourth amendment. In establishing such a
standard, the fact that the Supreme Court has gone through changes in
its approach to this problem over the years is not surprising. Cases in-
volving intrusion into garbage have, of course, been affected.
A. History of the Exclusionary Rule
The United States Supreme Court held in Weeks v. United States
that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is subject to
exclusion in the federal courts.3 9 The defendant in Weeks was suspected
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that
right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense...
Id.
35. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). In Steagald the Court stated that "[tihe
purpose of a warrant is to allow a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable
cause to make an arrest or conduct a search". Id. at 212.
36. Id.
37. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914). The Court concluded that this rule
should apply to state courts through the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961).
38, See W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 1.1(c), at 7. "It is primarily because of the exclusionary
rule that courts are called upon to meet the seemingly unceasing challenge of marking the dimen-
sions of the protections flowing from the Fourth Amendment." W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 1.1, at
3.
39. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390. The Court cited the opinion of Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). There Justice Bradley discussed the history and purpose of the fourth
amendment, stating that it was originated by the framers of the Bill of Rights to give the American
people safeguards which had evolved in England to protect against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Prior to these safeguards, such searches and seizures were permitted under general war-
rants issued by the government which allowed invasions of the homes and privacy of citizens and
seizures of their private papers to support real or imaginary charges made against them. This prac-
tice continued in the American colonies. Resistance to these practices established the fourth amend-
ment principle that "a man's house [is] his castle, and not to be invaded by any general authority to
search and seize his goods and papers." Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390.
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of mail fraud and arrested by police at his job.' ° The United States Mar-
shal and other police officers went to the defendant's home, gained access
without a warrant, and took various papers and articles belonging to the
defendant.41 The defendant's motion to have his possessions returned to
him prior to trial was denied.42 Letters found in the warrantless search,
incriminating to the defendant, were given to the district attorney,43 who
used them as evidence against the defendant at trial,' where he was sub-
sequently convicted.
The defendant appealed, challenging the court's allowance of the
use of his papers as evidence at trial.45 The Supreme Court found that
the United States Marshal was a United States official acting under the
color of his office and his acts were in direct violation of defendant's
constitutional rights.46 The Court held that the letters taken by the mar-
shal should have been restored to the accused and it was prejudicial error
to permit their use in the trial.47 As to the property seized by the police,
the Court held that because the police were not acting under any claim of
federal authority the fourth amendment did not apply to their unauthor-
ized seizures.48
Forty-six years later, the Supreme Court ruled in Mapp v. Ohio49
40. Id. at 386.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 388.
43. Id. at 389.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 393.
47. Id. at 398. The Court remarked that the protection of the fourth amendment "reaches all
alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon
all intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws." Id. at 392. The Court
also stated that "[t]he tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures... should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts,
which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution .. " Id.
48. Id. at 398. The Court noted that the efforts of courts and their officials to punish the guilty
are praiseworthy. However, if private property of an accused can be unlawfully seized and used as
evidence, the protection of the fourth amendment is of no value. Id. The Court further stated that it
would not address what remedies the defendant might have against the police officers. The fourth
amendment reaches only the federal government and its agencies, not the individual misconduct of
state officials. Id. (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908)).
49. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, the conviction was based on evidence seized during an
unlawful search of the defendant's home by state police. Id. at 643. The Ohio Supreme Court
upheld the conviction relying on the fact that the evidence was not seized "from defendant's person
by the use of brutal or offensive force against defendant." Id. at 645 (quoting State v. Mapp, 170
Ohio 427, 431, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389-90 (1960), rev'd, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). The United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. Id. at 660. The Court found that the right to
privacy, inherent in the fourth amendment, is enforceable against the states, and the right to be
secure against invasions of that privacy by state officers is of constitutional origin. Id. The Court
6
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that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is subject to
exclusion in state as well as federal courts.50 In so holding, the Court
overturned its decision in Wolf v. Colorado,51 which had held that the
fourteenth amendment did not preclude the admission of evidence ob-
tained by an unreasonable search in the prosecution in state courts of
state crimes. 2
B. Analysis of Unreasonable Search and Seizure of Garbage
Prior to 1967
The above cases firmly established the exclusionary rule in federal
and state courts. The next step was to decide upon a standard to use in
determining whether there had in fact been an illegal intrusion into a
citizen's personal effects. A landmark case decided in 1967, Katz v.
United States, 3 set the modern standard for cases involving warrantless
police searches. Prior to Katz, the courts used a property law approach
to decide which areas and interests were protected by the fourth amend-
ment.5 The issues the courts addressed were whether the defendant in-
tended to abandon55 the object which the police discovered and whether
the discovery was accomplished by trespass or intrusion upon the curti-
lage.16 Good examples of this pre-Katz approach as applied to unlawful
searches and seizures of garbage are Work v. United States57 and United
held that the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence is an essential element of the right to privacy
and must be applied to state courts. Id.
50. Id.
51. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
52. Id. at 33. In Wolf, the Court reaffirmed Weeks. The Court stated that people have the
right to be secure against arbitrary intrusions by the police and that this right is enforceable against
the states through the due process clause. Id. at 27. However, Wolf held that the Weeks exclusion-
ary rule would not be imposed on the states as "an essential ingredient of the right." Id. at 27-29.
Proponents of allowing the admission of illegally seized evidence in state courts, including Jus-
tice Cardozo, have argued that under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, "[t]he criminal is to
go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 587
(1926). The Court rejected this argument in Mapp, stating that even though this may be true on
some occasions, it is more important that the government uphold and not disregard its own laws.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
53. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
54. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 2.6(c), at 476.
55. Abandonment precludes fourth amendment protection because it signifies the end of a right
of privacy in the abandoned item. See Bush & Bly, Expectation of Privacy Analysis and Warrantless
Trash Reconnaissance after Katz v. United States, 23 ARiz. L. REv. 283 (1981).
56. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 2.6(c), at 476. The curtilage theory exists because the
fourth amendment protects "persons, houses, papers, and effects," but not the "open fields" beyond
the curtilage of the house. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
57. 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
1989]
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States v. Minker. 8
In Work, police received information that the defendant was using
narcotics at her home.5 9 They went to her home and, without a warrant,
walked uninvited through her door and into her hallway.60 The defend-
ant walked out the door and down the steps of the front porch, where she
opened the lid of a trash can and placed an object in the can. 61 The
police did not see what she placed there, but when they lifted the top off
the trash can, they found a phial of narcotics. 2 The defendant moved to
have the evidence suppressed at trial, but the motion was denied.
63
The Supreme Court, using the property analysis, held that the evi-
dence should have been suppressedA4 The Court reasoned that the plac-
ing of the phial in the trash can situated under the porch would not
constitute abandonment unless the person owning the article had author-
ized a trashman to remove the trash.65 Under the facts of this case there
was no abandonment even to trashmen 6 The Court also concluded that
because the search of the trash can occurred following an illegal entry by
police into the defendant's home, the discovery was accomplished by in-
trusion onto the curtilage.67
Minker involved a defendant who was convicted of attempting to
evade wagering excise taxes in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. 8
The defendant lived in an apartment building with a trash recepticle lo-
cated outside the structure, but on the premises.69 The recepticle was
used by the defendant and four other residents.70 Government agents
arranged to have the trash collector allow them to examine the contents
of the trash recepticle off the premises. 71 The agents found paper in the
58. 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963).
59. Work, 243 F.2d at 661.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 661-63.
62. Id. at 663.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 662.
66. Id. at 663. The Court said that instead of an abandonment, this was a "hiding." Id.
67. Id. at 662. The Court noted that it "need not decide whether the officers would have ob-
tained the phial independently of their illegal entry, since the circumstances show that the seizure
was a direct consequence of the search which began with the entry which did occur." Id.
68. United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 1962).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
[Vol. 24:401
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss3/3
CALIFORNIA v. GREENWOOD
trash which was incriminating to the defendant.72 The defendant chal-
lenged the taking of the paper as a violation of the fourth amendment.73
The Supreme Court held that the evidence need not be supressed.74
The Court reasoned that intent is a question of fact and abandonment is
a question of intent.75 The Court found that under the facts of this case
there was an intent to abandon. 76 The Court held that because the trash
recepticle was shared with four others, and a trashman had been hired to
remove the trash, the defendant had abandoned the trash and had no
constitutional right against a search of the trash.
77
The Court also addressed the curtilage doctrine, finding that rele-
vant factors as to whether a given area is within the protected curtilage of
a dwelling include: 1) the proximity of the area to the dwelling; 2)
whether the area is within an enclosure surrounding the dwelling; 3)
whether the area is used as an "adjunct to the domestic economy of the
family"; 78 and 4) the individual's interest and extent of the privacy of the
area.79 The Court found that because the trash recepticle was outside the
apartment complex it was not in an area entitled to constitutional
protection.80
C. The Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Analysis
In Katz v. United States8" the Court rejected the two-pronged prop-
erty test used in Work and Minker.82 The Court stated that the existence
of a violation of the fourth amendment does not depend on whether the
"area" invaded is "constitutionally protected."83 Instead, the Court
found that the fourth amendment "protects people not places."84
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing United States v. Wheeler, 161 F. Supp. 193, 198 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Schauffler v.
United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing Industry Local 420, 230 F.2d 572, 576
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 825 (1956)).
76. Minker, 312 F.2d at 634.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956)).
79. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)).
80. Id.
81. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
82. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 2.6(c), at 476.
83. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The Court noted that it had occasionally described conclusions using
the "[c]onstitutionally protected areas" language in the past but went on to say that that concept
does not serve as a "talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem." Id. at 351 n.9.
84. Id. at 351.
1989]
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In Katz, the defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering infor-
mation. 5 His conviction was based on recordings obtained after FBI
agents placed a microphone in a phone booth which they knew Katz
would be using.86 The question before the Court was whether these re-
cordings were obtained in violation of Katz's fourth amendment rights.87
The Court held that his fourth amendment rights were indeed violated.88
The government argued that the surveillance activities of the agents
should not be tested by fourth amendment standards because the tech-
nique employed did not involve any physical penetration into the
booth.89 The Court rejected this argument noting that it had expressly
held in Silverman v. United States9" that the fourth amendment governs
not only the seizure of tangible items, but also extends to recordings of
oral statements even without a property law trespass.91 The Court con-
cluded in Katz that because the fourth amendment protects people, the
question of whether there has been an unreasonable search and seizure
does not "turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion." 92
The government also argued that the defendant had placed his calls
from a glass booth so that he was visible to the public.93 The Court
found this argument unpersuasive because what one "seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected."94 Applying these findings to the facts of the case, the Court
found that although the defendant was visible to the public, what he
sought to exclude in the booth "was not the intruding eye-it was the
uninvited ear."95 The Court concluded that the government's surveil-
lance of the defendant in the phone booth violated the fourth amendment
85. Id. at 348.
86. Id. at 354. Six recordings, each approximately three minutes in length, with conversations
regarding placing of bets and wagering information, were obtained and admitted into evidence. Id.
at 354 n.14.
87. Id. at 349-50.
88. Id. at 359.
89. Id. at 352.
90. 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
91. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The Court noted that the absence of a
physical intrusion did at one time preclude fourth amendment protection. Id. (citing Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928)). However, this premise has since been discred-
ited. Id. (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 352.
94. Id. at 351 (citing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)). See also Exparte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1877). The Court acknowledged that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz, 389
U.S. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 (1927)).
95. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The Court further stated that anyone who enters a phone booth and
[Vol. 24:401
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because the defendant had a justifiable expectation of privacy.96
Justice Harlan in his concurrence stated that in a phone booth, as in
a home, a person does have a "reasonable expectation of privacy." 97 He
agreed that the fourth amendment protects people, not places. However,
he stated that what protection it gives people requires reference to a
"place." 98 Justice Harlan stated that "there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.' "9 Physical surroundings are important in
an analysis of what expectations of privacy are deemed to be reasonable;
therefore, although trespass onto curtilage is no longer considered con-
trolling, it should be taken into consideration. 1"
The Court has adopted Justice Harlan's test for deciding where and
when fourth amendment protection is appropriate. California v.
Rooneyt 0 1 concerned the warrantless search and seizure of trash. The
appeal was dismissed because in the opinion of the Court, the legality of
the search was not an issue properly before the Court. 2 Justice White,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, dissented."' The
dissenters believed that the question of the legality of the search was
properly presented and addressed the issues of the case."4 Justice White
stated that "[tlhe primary object of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
privacy, not property... ."I" White, therefore, found that the question
was not whether the defendant had abandoned his interest in the trash in
shuts the door, is certainly "entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not
be broadcast to the world." Id. at 352. In its conclusion the Court stated "[wiherever a man may
be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at
359.
96. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
99. Id. In explaining the test he wrote, "Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain veiw" of
outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the
expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable." Id. (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
100. Id.
101. 107 S. Ct. 2852 (1987).
102. Id. at 2855.
103. Id. at 2856 (White, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2859 (White, J., dissenting).
1989]
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a property law sense, but instead, whether he had a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in the garbage bin that society accepts as objectively rea-
sonable."0 6 The Court applied this same test in Greenwood." 7
IV. THE GREENWOOD DECISION
A. Decision of the Court
Applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Court con-
cluded that by placing plastic garbage bags on the curb for collection,
Greenwood sufficiently exposed his garbage to the public to defeat his
claim to fourth amendment protection. 108 The Court held that there is
no prohibition of a warrantless search and seizure of garbage left outside
the curtilage of the home for collection.'0 9
B. How The Court Reached its Decision
Greenwood claimed that he did have an actual expectation of pri-
vacy in the trash searched by the police." 0 The Court rejected this
claim and held that even if Greenwood did not expect the contents of his
garbage to become known to the police and others, there would be no
fourth amendment protection unless society is prepared to accept that
expectation as objectively reasonable."' The Court found that society is
not so prepared. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that it is
common knowledge that garbage bags left on or near a public street are
accessible to the public." 2 The Court stated that animals," 3 children,
scavengers," 4 and snoops' " all have access to the bags." 6 Next, the
106. Id. (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); California v. Ciraola, 476 U.S. 207
(1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
107. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988). "An expectation of privacy does
not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection... unless society is prepared to accept that expecta-
tion as objectively reasonable." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1630-31.
110. Id. at 1628.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1628-29.
113. Id. at 1628 n.2 (citing State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224 (N.D. 1985)) (held there was no
violation of the fourth amendment when police searched trash that a dog had dragged into a neigh-
bor's yard).
114. Id. at 1629 n.3 (citing M. SLOANE, "THE SUPERMARKET SHOPPER'S" 1980 GUIDE TO
COUPONS AND REFUNDS 74, 161 (1980) (A consumer columnist suggested many people in apart-
ments make friends with the building's trashman in order to obtain supermarket coupons. The
publication also told of a woman who donned rubber gloves and hip boots and waded through the
town dump once a week to find coupons.).
115. Id. at 1629 n.4 (citing The Washington Post, July 9, 1975, at Al, col. 8) (describing an
incident in which a reporter took garbage from outside Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's home).
[Vol. 24:401
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Court reasoned that because the defendant had left his trash out for col-
lection, the garbageman might have rummaged through the garbage him-
self or could have let the police do so." 7 Therefore, there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash.1 18 The Court cited Smith
v. Maryland" 9 for the proposition that there is no legitimate expectation
of privacy in information that one voluntarily turns over to third per-
sons.1 20 The Court's premise was that police cannot be expected to turn
away from criminal evidence that can be observed by any member of the
public. 2' The Court then noted that all federal appellate courts' 22 and
most state courts, 23 reviewing similar claims, have rejected the notion
that society will accept as objectively reasonable an expectation of pri-
vacy in trash that has been discarded in a public place.' 24 The Court
found that one factor on which fourth amendment analysis must turn is
"our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupu-
lous protection from government invasion."' 25 The Court concluded
that society does not have this understanding in connection with garbage
set on the curb for collection.1
26
116. Id. at 1628-29.
117. Id. at 1629.
118. Id.
119. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
120. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1629 (1988).
121. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
122. Id. at 1629-30 (citing United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533-54 (1lth Cir. 1985); United States v. Michaels, 726
F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d
39, 49 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 791-94 (7th Cir.), cert denied,
464 U.S. 962 (1983); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 308-09 (2nd Cir.), cert denied sub nor.
Williams v. United States, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d
Cir. 1981); United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1081
(1980); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959
(1979); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112-13 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States v. Mus-
tone, 469 F.2d 970, 972-74 (lst Cir. 1972)).
123. Id. at 1630 (citing Commonwealth v. Chappee, 492 N.E.2d 719, 721-22 (Mass. 1986);
Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653, 656 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985); State v.
Stevens, 367 N.W.2d 788, 794-97 (Wis.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985); State v. Ronngren, 361
N.W.2d 224, 228-30 (N.D. 1985); State v. Brown, 484 N.E.2d 215, 217-18 (Ohio 1984); State v.
Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1982); People v. Whotte, 113 Mich. App. 12, 317 N.W.2d 266
(1982); Commonwealth v. Minton, 288 Pa. Super. 381, 391, 432 A.2d 212, 217 (1981); State v.
Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Huddleston, 38 Ill. App. 3d 277, 347
N.E.2d 76 (1976); Willis v. State, 518 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Smith v. State, 510
P.2d 793 (Alaska), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973); State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, 592-93, 503
P.2d 807, 813-14 (1972); Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Wyo. 1970); State v. Purvis, 249 Or.
404, 411, 438 P.2d 1002, 1005 (1968)). But see People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96
Cal. Rptr. 62 (1986); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985).
124. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1630.
125. Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
126. Id. at 1630-31.
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V. ANALYSIS
The Court's conclusion in Greenwood ignores society's need for pri-
vacy in garbage because so much can be ascertained about people by
scrutinizing their garbage. Further, the Court's holding can be read too
broadly. If the holding is not limited to the facts of the case, law enforce-
ment officials, without any supervision, can obtain trash at their own
whim and use information gained from trash for any purpose they wish.
In addition, private individuals or other government officials might con-
ceivably take advantage of the holding in the same way.
A. Society's Need for Privacy in Garbage
The Court failed to address Greenwood's arguments for the legiti-
mation of an expectation of privacy in garbage. In its disregard for the
defendant's arguments, the Court appears to have followed the reasoning
used in United States v. Shelby.127 Shelby was a warrantless trash search
case in which the Seventh Circuit court applied the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test.12 The defendant claimed an expectation of privacy
in his trash." 9 The court rejected this argument stating that, "[i]n the
real world to so view the status of one's discarded trash is totally unreal-
istic, unreasonable, and in complete disregard of the mechanics of its
disposal." '
Courts following the reasoning set out in Shelby are too insensitive
and ignore the fact which the dissent in Greenwood points out:
"[S]crutiny of another's trash is contrary to the notions of civilized be-
havior."13 These courts have jumped to the conclusion that no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy exists, without any analysis of societal
privacy needs. As the court in Krivda recognized:
We can readily ascribe many reasons why residents would not want
their castaway clothing, letters, medicine bottles or other telltale refuse
and trash to be examined by neighbors or others, at least not until the
trash had lost its identity and meaning by becoming part of a large con-
glomeration of trash elsewhere. Half truths leading to rumor and gos-
sip may readily flow from an attempt to "read" the contents of
127. 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978).
128. Id. at 973.
129. Id.
130. Id. In addition the court chided that it "seems to be more prudent to put only genuine
trash, not secrets, in garbage cans, except perhaps in California." Id. at 974.
131. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan stated society would be shocked to learn that the Court, "the ultimate guarantor of liberty,"
has deemed an expectation of privacy in garbage unreasonable. Id.
[Vol. 24:401
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another's trash.132
Counsel for Greenwood aptly pointed out in their brief that in de-
ciding whether "trash" is protected by the Constitution, the label "trash"
is unfortunate because it conjures up images of scavengers sifting through
banana peels and used dinner napkins, when included among these items
are also financial records, discarded drug prescription bottles, letters
from children divulging their indiscretions, and other intimate family
secrets. 133  Trash can reveal myriad details about the life of its
disposer. 134
One source for the legitimation of an expectation of privacy is "by
reference to concepts of real or personal property or to understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society." 135 The majority in Green-
wood, without qualification or limitation, has decided that government
seizure of trash is an activity that is recognized and permitted by society.
This assumption may be indicative of the personal views of the members
of the Court; however, it is incompatable with society's right to preserve
its possessions and beliefs as private and free from government
132. People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 366, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 68, (1971)
(quoting People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1104,458 P.2d 713, 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638 (1971)
(emphasis added by the Krivda court)), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 33 (1972). This argument
is justified. A.J. Weberman, the author of an article in Esquire Magazine, went to the homes of
various celebrities, sifted through their garbage, photographed it, and published the photographs
with descriptions of what he had found and what he thought it meant. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at
1634 (citing Weberman, The Art of Garbage Analysis: You Are What You Throw Away, ESQUIRE,
Nov. 1971, at 113). One commentator has noted many other ways garbage searches are used in an
unscrupulous manner. For example, industrial spies investigate trash to find competitors' secrets,
and campaign managers do the same to obtain information about opposing candidates. Bush & Bly,
supra note 55, at 283, 312. In one case a party to a lawsuit went through his opponent's trash to find
copies of confidential letters that had been written to his opponent's counsel and obtained informa-
tion that would have otherwise been protected by the attorney-client privilege. Suburban Sew 'N
Sweep v. Swiss Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981). A list of intolerable uses of the investi-
gation of trash could clearly become extensive.
133. Brief for Respondent at 7 n.8, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (No. 86-
684).
134. California v. Rooney, 107 S. Ct. 2852, 2859 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). See also Green-
wood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180
(1980)). As Justice Brennan stated:
A search of trash, like a search of the bedroom, can relate intimate details about sexual
practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling through desk drawers or intercepting
phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the target's financial and professional
status, political affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts, personal relationships, and
romantic interests. It cannot be doubted that a sealed trash bag harbors telling evidence of
the "intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and privacies of life,'"
which the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect.
Id. (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180).
135. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.22 (1984). See also Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at
1635.
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intrusion. 136
1. Analysis of Greenwood's Claims of an Expectation of Privacy
in Garbage
Clearly, society does have a valid interest in privacy in garbage. Be-
cause of this, the Court should have addressed Greenwood's claim for his
own subjective expectation of privacy in trash before concluding that any
expectation of privacy in trash is objectively unreasonable. Greenwood
based his claim for an expectation of privacy in his trash on three
contentions:
First, the trash was set on the curb at a fixed time and was there
only temporarily, so there was little likelihood that it would be inspected
by anyone. 37 The police officers had to examine the garbage at a precise
time of the day because it would otherwise be too late to distinguish it
from other trash once placed in the truck.3 s That the trash would not
be at the curb long enough for animals, scavengers, children, or other
members of the public to invade it was reasonable to believe. Even if the
trash was there long enough to be accessible to animals, "common sense
tells us that one should be able to expect that his property and the trash
containers will be free from search and seizure by the police, neighbors,
and others who are or should be more knowledgeable and respectful of
the property and privacy rights of others." '39 Arguably most citizens
would probably find this expectation reasonable.
Second, the trash was contained in opaque plastic bags tied at the
top. 'I Justice Brennan pointed out that "so long as a package is 'closed
against inspection,' the Fourth Amendment protects its contents 'wher-
ever they may be,' and the police must obtain a warrant to search it
"4.... "I Further, "unless the container is such that its contents may be
said to be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by the Fourth
Amendment."142 Greenwood's garbage bags were sealed at the top, and
nothing was visible to onlookers. 43 Justice Brennan reasoned that if
136. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text, discussing the fourth amendment.
137. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
138. Brief for Respondent at 10, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (No. 86-684).
"Illustrative is the fact that, on one of the occasions, the collector had not maintained several of the
bags separate from other trash, and Petitioner's trash became irretrievable." Id.
139. State v. Shultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Anstead, J., dissenting).
140. Brief for Opposition at 1, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (No. 86-684).
141. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1632 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)).
142. Id. (quoting Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981)).
143. Brief for Respondent at 17, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (No.86-684).
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Greenwood had been carrying his possessions in these same bags his ex-
pectation of privacy would have been protected under the fourth
amendment. 44
Third, Greenwood expected the garbage collector to pick up the
trash and mingle it with the trash of others.' 4  The Court has specifi-
cally held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in infor-
mation he voluntarily turns over to third parties. 146  The underlying
premise is that if there is consent for garbage collectors to take away
trash, there is a waiver of an expectation of privacy. 47
The Court made the presumption that Greenwood waived his expec-
tation of privacy by conveying the trash to the garbage collector. 148 This
approach ignores the fact that "[t]he burden is on the government to
justify the validity of a warrantless search and a court should not pre-
sume a waiver of a constitutional right." 149 In addition, the Court seems
to have used the property law abandonment approach which it has previ-
ously rejected. 50 Individuals often turn over items to third persons and
still retain a legitimate privacy interest in them. 5' For example, individ-
uals retain a privacy interest in mail which is conveyed to government
and private entities for delivery.' 52 There is no reason for the Court to
Counsel for the defendant stated in its brief that Greenwood did everything he could, short of plac-
ing a label on his garbage bag or a sign on his lawn, prohibiting garbagemen or scavengers from
opening them and this manifested an expectation of privacy. Id. In addition, Justice Brennan noted
that if the contents in a container are not clearly observable by others there is no distinction between
"worthy" and "unworthy" containers. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1632 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981)).
144. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated: "Respon-
dents deserve no less protection just because Greenwood used the bags to discard rather than to
transport his personal effects. Their contents are not inherently any less private, and Greenwood's
decision to discard them, at least in the manner in which he did, does not diminish his expectation of
privacy." Id
145. Id. at 1628.
146. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
147. See Bush & Bly, supra note 55, at 306. The authors assert that this is the curtilage theory
revisited. Once the trash is in the hands of the authorized garbage collector and not at the home of
the disposer, the police are allowed to search the trash, presumably because it is outside the curti-
lage. Id.
148. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29 (1988).
149. Bush & Bly, supra note 55, at 306 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 222). See also
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967); People v. Howard, 408 N.E.2d 908, 915 (1980).
150. See supra notes 81-107 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of propery law
concepts in the fourth amendment analysis).
151. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1637 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that "even
the voluntary relinquishment of possession or control over an effect does not necessarily amount to a
relinquishment of a privacy expectation in it." Id.
152. Id. Justice Brennan stated that if this were not so, a letter or package would lose constitu-
tional protection when placed in a mail box with the purpose of conveying it to a postal officer or
17
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presume that individuals do not intend to retain a privacy interest in
their garbage simply because it is entrusted to the care of a garbage
collector.
In this case, it cannot be said that Greenwood voluntarily conveyed
his garbage to third persons or impliedly consented to have the garbage
collector take the trash. A county ordinance where Greenwood resided
dictated the manner in which trash was to be discarded.15 A govern-
mental penal statute compelled the conveyance of trash to third persons.
Burying or burning trash was also unlawful.154 Therefore, Greenwood
cannot be said to have placed his trash on the curb freely and voluntarily
or to have given actual or implied consent for the collector to do with it
as he pleased. Even if there were consent on Greenwood's part for the
collector to sift through his garbage, there was no consent for the police
to search it without a warrant. "The assertion, without further analysis,
that once the garbage leaves the owner's property, no fourth amendment
right can be asserted, simply does not conform to Katz's holding that 'the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' ,155
In addition, the Court found that there is no expectation of privacy
in trash on the curb because trash collectors, along with scavengers and
other members of the public, might be able to examine the trash and
allow the police to do so.'56 This ignores the fact that "[tihe merepossi-
bility that unwelcome meddlers might open and rummage through the
containers does not negate the expectation of privacy in its contents
any more than the possibility of a burglary negates an expectation of
privacy in the home ... ."157 The lack of absolute certainty in privacy
private carrier who are bailees, as is a garbageman, and have a greater incentive to intrude upon the
personal effects placed in their care. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1637 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970);
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
153. ORANGE COUNTY, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-3-45(a) (1986). The statute provides:
"solid waste created, produced or accumulated in an apartment house or a dwelling house, or other
place of human habitation shall be removed from the premises at least once a week." Id.
154. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1637 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); ORANGE
COUNTY, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 3-3-85 (1986).
155. Bush & Bly, supra note 55, at 306 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
156. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
157. Id. at 1636 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan gave other examples: the possibility
of private intrusion does not negate an expectation of privacy in an unopened package or the possi-
bility that someone will listen to a phone call does not negate an expectation of privacy in the words
spoken. Id. See also People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969)
(Even though a hotel guest might know that a maid will enter the room to clean, there should be no
expectation that a hotel employee will allow police to search the room.); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610 (1961) (Although a landlord had authority to enter a tenant's house for some purposes,
the tenant's constitutional rights were violated when the landlord allowed police to search it.).
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expectations does not support a finding that the privacy expectation was
unreasonable."i 8 Therefore, although one may not be absolutely certain
that a garbage collector or scavenger will not rummage through garbage,
to expect that police will not do so is not unreasonable.
Another argument in support of an expectation of privacy in trash is
the fact that when an individual places trash on the curb on a designated
day for collection, the expectation that the trash will be intermingled
with that of others and later will be buried forever at the local dump is
reasonable. 159 It is reasonable for people to "believe that police will not
indiscriminately rummage through their trash bags to discover their per-
sonal effects." 16
2. The Alternative Argument for a Lowered Expectation of
Privacy In Garbage Standard Which the Court Failed
to Address
There are very good arguments on the side of recognizing a reason-
able expectation of privacy in garbage. However, the majority in Green-
wood was unwilling to accept them. One well-reasoned alternative
submitted by counsel for the defendant would have been an excellent
compromise, but the court failed to address it. 6 '
The defendant's counsel argued that if the Court was unwilling to
conclude that an expectation of privacy in trash is equal to an expecta-
tion of privacy in objects in the home or in phone conversations, then the
158. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia in his concur-
ring opinion stated that
[i]t is privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment, not solitude. A man enjoys
Fourth Amendment protection in his home, for example, even though his wife and chil-
dren have the run of the place-and, indeed, even though his landlord has the right to
conduct unannounced inspections at any time. Similarly, in my view, one's personal office
is constitutionally protected against warrantless intrusions by the police, even though em-
ployer and co-workers are not excluded.
Id. at 730.
159. See People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 366, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 68 (1971).
See also State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Anstead, J., dissenting),
where a dissenting judge wrote:
[A] homeowner, upon placing items in a closed garbage container and placing the
container in a position on his property where the container can be conveniently removed by
authorized trash collectors, is entitled to reasonably expect that the container and the trash
therein will be removed from his property only by those authorized to do so, and that such
trash will be disposed of in the manner provided by ordinance or private contract.
Id.
160. State v. Tanaka, 68 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (1985).
161. Brief for Respondent at 24-28, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (No. 86-
1989]
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Court should at least grant a limited expectation of privacy in trash.1 62
In United States v. Ross 163 police had probable cause to believe that con-
traband would be found in an automobile on the road. Acting on this
probable cause, police stopped and searched the automobile. The war-
rantless search was upheld. 164 The Court recognized that individuals
have a reasonable but lowered expectation of privacy in an easily mova-
ble object. 65 Therefore, where an easily movable object is involved, po-
lice must have probable cause, but may forego the requirement of a
decision by a neutral magistrate. 16
6
Greenwood's counsel contended that if the Court were to deny full
fourth amendment protection to trash left at the curbside, it should
adopt the rules stated in Ross, thereby requiring at least probable cause
before a warrantless search takes place where an individual manifests a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash.167 The Court did not ac-
knowledge this argument in its opinion. If the Court had agreed with
this lowered expectation standard, Greenwood might have gone free be-
cause it was strongly argued that the police officers did not act on prob-
able cause when they searched the trash.
1 68
B. Implications for Future Cases
Because the Court failed to give any credence to the arguments set
out above, there is a danger that the Court's holding will be read too
broadly. As a consequence of the sweeping decision that society has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage for fourth amendment pur-
poses, the Court has jeopardized society's legitimate privacy interest in
garbage. There is no mention of guidelines for police conduct and no
mention of what implications the holding will have when applied to the
intrusive use of garbage by private individuals or other government
officials.
162. Id. at 24.
163. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
164. Brief for Respondent at 24, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (No. 86-684)
(citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-08 (1982)).
165. Id. at 25.
166. Id In Ross, the Court noted that "individuals always had been on notice that movable
vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle contains
contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those facts." Ross,
456 U.S. at 806 n.8.
167. Brief for Respondent at 26, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (No. 86-864).
168. Id. at 27. According to the defendant's brief, Officer Stracner conducted the initial searches
based upon conjecture and unsupported, uncorroborated information from an informant. Id.
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1. The Need for Guidelines for Police Conduct
in Garbage Searches
The Greenwood decision may have an intolerable impact on the
means by which police search for evidence. The Court gave no guide-
lines for reasonable police behavior in conducting trash searches. Be-
cause the Court has rejected a probable cause requirement, the door may
be opened to "unbridled police harrassment."' 169 Significant amounts of
information about a person can be obtained from an examination of
trash.170 Moreover, "the amount of information gained about the dis-
poser logically is proportional to the number of searches performed." '
Thus, as the number of searches increases, so does the amount of intru-
sion into privacy. Unconstrained exploratory searches which are con-
ducted until something incriminating is found should not be allowed.' 72
Although a search may be reasonable under the fourth amendment at its
commencement, if its scope and intensity become intolerable it will be-
come a violation of the fourth amendment.1 73 Harrassment is inherent
when police are determined to find incriminating evidence no matter how
many searches it takes to find such evidence. 174
2. The Need for Individuals to Have Recourse if Private
Citizens Damage Them Through Information
Obtained from Trash Searches
Fourth amendment protection applies only to government action
and Greenwood leaves unclear what rights private citizens might have to
information obtained from trash. One might presume that the police will
use fruits of warrantless trash searches only for legitimate purposes. 175
However, it could be dangerous to read the Greenwood holding to extend
to the acts of private individuals or to other government employees who
might use garbage in an unscrupulous manner. Reading the holding to
include these acts will increase the number of people who, by having
legitimate access to trash, are capable of inflicting damage by negligence,
ignorance, or lack of sensitivity to personal privacy of others.
176
169. Bush & Bly, supra note 56, at 304.
170. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
171. Bush & Bly, supra note 56, at 304.
172. Cf Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
173. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968).
174. See Bush & Bly, supra note 56, at 319.
175. Bush & Bly, supra note 56, at 313.
176. Cf. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 32.
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One case in which the Greenwood holding was read to include the
unscrupulous use of trash by private individuals and public employees is
Rice v. City of Oneonta.' One day, as a prank, Mrs. Rice's daughter
took a photograph of her as she was getting dressed. 178 The photo ended
up in Mrs. Rice's garbage. Richard Eakes, the garbage collector, fished it
out of the garbage and "paraded this photograph of her scantily-clad
body around town." '17 9 Mrs. Rice and her husband were embarrassed
and outraged when they received this information. 80 Mrs. Rice claimed
that the appropriation of the photograph and the publication of it to sev-
eral individuals violated her constitutional right of privacy.'81 She
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.182 She also claimed inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and the tort of outrage.1, 3 The de-
fendants, the City of Oneonta and Richard Eakes, moved for
dismissal.184 The court granted the motion.
The court first noted that "[s]ection 1983 requires both deprivation
of a constitutional right and action by a defendant under color of state
law." 185 The court then conceded that the taking of the photo from the
trash by Eakes was arguably under color of state law since the function
of sanitation workers is to collect and dispose of trash. 86 The court
found, however, that Mrs. Rice had no "constitutional property or lib-
erty interest in the contents of the trash which could have been abridged
by Eakes' appropriation." '187
The court used the authority of Greenwood as the grounds for this
finding. The court stated that "[w]hile Greenwood held that there was no
expectation of privacy in trash vis-a-vis police conduct for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment, the Court premised its decision in part on the
177. No. CV 88-P-0767-S, slip op. (N.D. Ala. July 25, 1988).
178. This was the statement Mrs. Rice's attorney gave the newspaper. Birmingham Post Herald,
Aug. 6, 1988, at 16A.
179. Id.
180. Id. According to the newspaper article Eakes showed off the photograph at a Christmas
family gathering and one of Mrs. Rice's friends or relatives was there and realized who it was and
told Mrs. Rice about it. Id.
181. Rice, slip op. at 2.
182. Id See Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates "a species of tort liability' in favor of
persons who are deprived of'rights, privileges, or immunities secured' to them by the Constitution."
Id. at 305-06 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978)).
183. Rice, slip op. at 2.
184. Id.
185. Id (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); Dollar v. Haralson County, 704 F.2d
1540, 1542-43 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 963 (1983).
186. Id.
187. Id.
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basis that people should expect their trash to be searched by trash collec-
tors."18' The court concluded that there is no authority for "requiring
the court to treat claims of a property or liberty interest under the Four-
teenth Amendment differently from those asserting an expectation of pri-
vacy under the Fourth Amendment." '189 Therefore, the court held that,
although the publication of the photograph may have caused embarrass-
ment to Mrs. Rice and her husband, her constitutionally protected pri-
vacy interest was not infringed. 190 Because the section 1983 claims were
dismissed, the federal district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over
the state law tort claims. 191
The right of privacy, as a legal concept, has two main aspects.1 9
2
The first is a general law of privacy which provides for damages which
result from unlawful invasion of privacy. 193 Second is the constitutional
right of privacy which protects against unlawful government invasion.1 94
There are four violations of the right to privacy recognized as supporting
a claim for damages: 1) intrusion; 2) public disclosure of private facts; 3)
false light in the public eye; and 4) appropriation. 195 There is a danger as
a result of the holding in Greenwood that an individual whose garbage is
used in any one of these four manners will have no legal recourse for
recovery. In order to recover on any of these causes of action, it must be
shown that what was intruded upon or published was private and the
intrusion must be offensive to a person of "ordinary sensibilities." 196
Whether the courts treat information obtained from trash as private
188. Id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988)).
189. Id. (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977)) (Supreme Court refused to hold
that the fourth amendment's interest in privacy offers more protection than any right or liberty
protected by the fourteenth amendment).
190. Rice, No. CV 88-P-0767-S, slip op. (N.D. Ala. July 25, 1988). In addition, the court found
that "Eakes' display of the photo was clearly done for purposes of his own amusement and cannot be
considered an exercise of power 'possessed by virtue of state law.'" Id. (quoting United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). The Court held that since Mrs. Rice had no section 1983 claim
against Eakes, their claim against the city must also be dismissed.
191. Id.
192. Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to the Federal Legal Aspects of the Right of Privacy,
43 L.Ed.2d 871, 875-76 (1976).
193. Until the close of the nineteenth century, a person whose privacy was invaded had no re-
dress in the courts. The courts saw mental distress caused by loss of a personal right to privacy too
unimportant to be a legitimate cause of action. The courts were also fearful that providing protec-
tion for this personal interest would open the "floodgates of litigation." A. MILLER, supra note 1, at
169-70. Because of an article written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890), the right to recover for invasion of privacy has received
overwhelming recognition. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 849-
69 (5th ed. 1984).
194. W. KEETON, supra note 194 at 866-67.
195. W. KEETON, supra note 194, at 851-69.
196. W. KEETON, supra note 194 at 857; A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 181.
1989]
23
Minor: Was the Right of Privacy Trashed in California v. Greenwood
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
depends on the general community's attitude rather than a fixed norm. 197
The success of an invasion of privacy action depends on the community's
ability to distinguish what is part of the public domain and what should
not be.198 Because of the Supreme Court's holding in Greenwood, a pri-
vacy cause of action may suffer from this community standard. 199 The
Rice case200 demonstrates that the Greenwood holding can be interpreted
to define information found in trash as public so the law will not protect
it. Once this standard is accepted, the next step would be to say the
intrusion is not offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities. This would
be an unfair and untrue statement.
If Mrs. Rice decides to pursue her tort claims in state court, the
holding of Greenwood should not prevent her from recovering damages
from Eakes. However, it appears from the holding in Rice that the con-
tents of garbage are everyone's business,20 and unfortunately, this atti-
tude may prohibit Mrs. Rice from recovering damages.
C. How the Court's Opinion Should be Interpreted in Order to Avoid
Guideline Deficiencies
1. The Holding Should be Read Narrowly to Impose Some
Control Over Police Conduct in Garbage Searches
The holding in Greenwood should be read narrowly to allow war-
rantless trash search only when facts exist similar to the ones presented
in Greenwood, where the police intrusion was minimal. In some situa-
tions, a warrantless garbage search may be the only effective means of
gaining criminal evidence. As the Court in Greenwood stated: "[o]ur
decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule have balanced the benefits of deterring police misconduct against the
costs of excluding reliable evidence of criminal activity."2 "2 Because the
Court approves of this balancing test and has found that probable cause
is not required, it should at least narrow the holding of the case to the
197. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 181.
198. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 181.
199. In order to recover for an invasion of privacy, "the intrusion must be something which
would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person.... It is clear also that the thing into
which there is intrusion or prying must be, and be entitled to be, private." W. KEETON, supra note
194, at 855.
200. Rice v. City of Oneonta, No. CV 88-P-0767-S slip op. (N.D. Ala. July 25, 1988). See also
supra notes 178-92 and accompanying text.
201. Birmingham Post Herald, Aug. 6, 1988, at 16A.
202. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (1988) (citing United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 908-13 (1984)).
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specific circumstances involved in the case and require some reasonable
basis for a trash search.
Under the facts of Greenwood, officers Stracner and Rahaueser at
least had a "legitimate suspicion" 0 3 that they would find evidence of
drugs.' 4 This legitimate suspicion standard requires that a "police of-
ficer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion."2 ' Use of this standard would allow recognition of a
need for warrantless search of garbage, but would prevent unrestrained
intrusion into individuals' private effects.20 6
The Court also noted in its ruling that it will not indiscriminately
apply the exclusionary rule "when law enforcement officers have acted in
objective good faith or their transgressions are minor. ' 20 7  Under the
facts of Greenwood, the police officers appeared to have acted in good
faith with minimal intrusiveness. The Court's refusal to apply the exclu-
sionary rule should be limited to circumstances where the police waited
until the garbage was collected by the authorized collector. An individ-
ual should have the right to retrieve trash until authorized collectors re-
move it from the property. 08
Further, though there was more than one search in this case, it does
not appear that its scope and intensity became intolerable. The holding
should be limited to these facts. 20 9
At the point where legitimate suspicion turns into a groundless be-
lief, the searches should stop. Courts must preserve their constitutional
responsibility to protect against police conduct which is harrassing or
intrudes upon personal privacy or security by mandating warrants, is-
sued by an impartial magistrate.2 10 The police should still be required to
203. See Bush & Bly, supra note 56, at 318-19.
204. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627. One of Greenwood's neighbors was an informant, and
observed the suspicious late-night activity at Greenwood's home. Id.
205. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
206. Bush & Bly, supra note 56, at 319.
207. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1631 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1970)).
208. State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1330-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Anstead, J.,
dissenting).
209. See Bush & Bly, supra note 56, at 319.
If the police had a legitimate suspicion to justify [a] one time search, they should not be
limited by whether fortune leads them to search the right batch of garbage the first time.
Nevertheless, a point is reached after some number of searches when the legitimate suspi-
cion becomes either probable cause sufficient to obtain a warrant or else turns into ground-
less belief which cannot excuse a further fishing expedition.
Id.
210. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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obtain a warrant for searches and seizures whenever their reasonable sus-
picion becomes probable cause.2 n
2. The Holding Should be Read Narrowly in Order to Disallow
Unscrupulous Use of Trash by Private Individuals and
Other Government Employees
The holding should be read narrowly to apply only to fourth amend-
ment search and seizure cases. "[T]he potential for unscrupulous use of
seized garbage has been demonstrated," and there is a need to protect the
disposer of garbage from these unscrupulous uses.21 2 The holding in
Greenwood should be based completely on a need to minimize the exclu-
sion of reliable evidence in criminal cases. The holding should not be
extended to civil damage actions to punish improper interceptions and
use of data gained in trash searches conducted by private individuals and
other government officials.
The concept of the right of privacy is nearly impossible to define
because it is vague and means different things to different people.213
However, the conclusion reached by most attorneys and social scientists
is that the basic attribute of a right to privacy is the individuals' ability to
control the circulation of information relating to themselves.21 4 When
individuals are deprived of the right to control information pertaining to
themselves, they become subservient to people and institutions able to
manipulate the information.215
There are dangerous effects in holding that an individual's trash is
not private. To have information coercively extracted from a person's
trash or gathered without their knowledge is violative of the constitu-
tional right of privacy.216 The presentation of evidence of a person's ac-
tions and associations to an audience to which the person did not consent
or anticipate when he surrendered the information could be harmful.217
There can easily be factual and contextual inaccuracies in the data that
give an erroneous impression of the subject's actual conduct or activi-
ties.218 Further, a person who has gained access to an individual's trash
can use the information to damage the owner of the trash without the
211. Id. at 20.
212. Bush & Bly, supra note 56, at 313.
213. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 25.
214. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 25.
215. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 25.
216. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 47.
217. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 32.
218. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 32.
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owner knowing about it.2 19 Even if victims could trace the damage to the
improper use of their trash, they may be prevented from recovering dam-
ages if the contents of trash are seen as public.22 °
There is a need for guidelines to direct how the contents of garbage
can be used. The threat of private information being leaked to the public
increases with the holding in Greenwood unless the decision is read to
apply only to use of criminal evidence taken with reasonable suspicion on
the part of police officers. It should be implicit in the Greenwood hold-
ing that safeguards and restraints remain against improper dissemination
of trash.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has "the responsibility to enforce constitutional
guarantees. ' 221 The holding in Greenwood ignores this obligation.
Rather than apply the Greenwood majority's broad, generalized approach
that there is no justifiable expectation of privacy in garbage, each case
should be decided on its own facts. If this is not done, substantial pri-
vacy interests may be invaded in an intolerable manner. Application of
the Greenwood holding should be based completely on the need to mini-
mize the exclusion of reliable criminal evidence. Restrictive guidelines
for police conduct in garbage searches should be read as implicit in the
holding. In addition, the holding should not be read to prohibit liability
for improper interceptions and use of data gained in trash searches by
private individuals and other government employees.
Mary Elizabeth Minor
219. Cf. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 177.
220. Cf. A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 177. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
221. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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